We examine market structure and optimal commodity taxation in a world in which firms produce differentiated products and can exert some degree of market power. Building on Kay and Keen (1983) , we model two forms of product technologies, two forms of market entry structures, and two forms of pricing. This yields eight models providing a richer analysis of the role of taxes as regulatory tools than could be provided in Kay and Keen's analysis. In the presence of price discrimination, tax policy loses much of its effectiveness at serving as a substitute for direct regulation. Moreover, in cases where taxes can influence market structure, subsides rather than taxes may be required to achieve optimum market structure. Our results should remove the presumption that has developed over the past twenty years that the ad valorem tax rate should be positive to discourage excess entry in imperfectly competitive markets.
Introduction
It is well accepted that the appropriate design of commodity taxes is affected by market structure. It is equally well recognized that commodity taxes can serve as regulatory instruments to achieve desired market structure outcomes in cases where firms produce differentiated products and so are able to exert some degree of market power. This latter idea was first explicitly analyzed by Kay and Keen (1983) who showed that in differentiated product markets, ad valorem taxes should be used to achieve desired product variety, while specific taxes are used as revenue raising instruments. Even if there were no need for distorting taxes for revenue raising purposes due to the existence of lump sum taxation, it still might be desirable to levy an ad valorem tax to alter the equilibrium number of firms in the market. In other words, the ad valorem tax could be welfare enhancing over some range.
The specific contribution of this paper is to extend the Kay and Keen analysis along three dimensions to introduce market elements that recent modeling of spatial and, more generally, differentiated product markets have shown to be important in determining market structure. First, we model two types of production technology: designated and flexible. Firms with a designated technology produce a given product type and consumers bear a transport or utility cost when they purchase a product that differs from their most preferred product. Firms with a flexible technology can customize their products to the consumer's specifications thus avoiding the utility loss, but at a customization cost. Second, we explicitly model the entry decisions of firms. We know from the work of, for example, Eaton and Wooders (1984) , and Norman and Thisse (1996) , (1999) that equilibrium market structure is affected by the ability of incumbents to commit to their location, or product design choices: what Norman and Thisse (1996) refer to as the degree of spatial contestability. In our analysis we consider two polar cases. Firms may be able to relocate costlessly when new firms enter (what we call spatial contestability) or relocation may be prohibitively costly (what we call spatial non-contestability). Third, we allow for two different pricing assumptions: uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing.
We thus have eight possible models of firm and market behavior with which to investigate the role of tax policy in effecting optimal market structure. The Kay and Keen model is one of those eight models (designated technology, spatial contestability, and uniform pricing). Optimal taxes in the other seven models have not previously been studied.
We should emphasize that the point of this paper is not to pin down optimal tax rates once the economist has pinned down the appropriate market conditions. Rather, our analysis is intended to correct a presumption that has evolved since the original Kay and Keen analysis that there tends to be excessive entry and that this excessive entry can be corrected with a positive ad valorem tax rate. We show that the Kay and Keen model is but one of many different models of market structure. In some of those models there is excessive entry which can be controlled with an ad valorem tax rate. In others, there is too little entry in which case the optimal tax rate is negative (a subsidy is called for),
while in yet others the ad valorem tax is totally ineffective in determining market structure.
This re-examination of the Kay and Keen results and the generalization of their model is relevant and timely for at least two reasons. First, price discrimination is a reality that the current regulatory environment does little to control. The Price Commission in the United Kingdom that tried to articulate a consistent no-pricediscrimination policy has long been abolished and its policy abandoned. The EU Competition Directorate would like to see "convergence" in prices across member states but has to live with the uncomfortable fact that considerable price dispersion persists.
1
In the United States it might be thought that the Robinson-Patman Act works to prevent price discrimination but this is a misreading of the Act and its application. As was stated by the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission in a speech in 1995:
"section 2(c) permits price differences that represent good faith efforts to meet the competition of one or more other firms… (T)he essential principle is that firms should be able to lower their prices, in order to meet the prices of their rivals, without violating section 2(a)." (Federal Trade Commission (1995, p.5)) This is precisely the context within which our analysis is placed.
Second, price discrimination is likely to become increasingly common as a result of recent technological change. We are seeing the increasingly wide adoption of flexible manufacturing systems, defined as "a production unit capable of producing a range of discrete products with a minimum of manual intervention" (U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1984), p. 60). These systems allow firms to switch product specifications easily, with the result that firms adopting this type of technology can customize their products to the specific requirements of their buyers at little or no cost penalty. Developments in e-commerce have further extended the ability of firms to customize or "version" the services and products offered to customers based upon information gathered about each customer's preferences.
"What this means in practice is that rather than display the same set of pages to every visitor, a Web site would present different information to each customer based on the person's data profile." (Stellin (2000) ) What this and the more general use of flexible manufacturing also mean is that not only do we get our very own customized products or personalized Web pages; we may also get our very own customized or personalized prices. Simply put, one important impact of these new technologies is that they undermine the ability of firms to commit to nondiscriminatory prices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we outline the basic model on which our analysis is based. In the following two sections we identify the impact of commodity taxes on market structure, in section 3 when firms do not price discriminate and in section 4 in the presence of price discrimination. Our main conclusions are summarized in the final section.
The Model
We base our analysis on the Salop (1979) model that has become standard in the literature on horizontal product differentiation. A particular virtue of this model is that it explicitly allows us to identify the equilibrium number of firms and so to ascertain the connection between the regulatory and technological regime, market structure and the impact -and so optimal design -of commodity taxes.
Our market is represented as a one-dimensional attribute space with support [0, L] which, to avoid end-point problems, we assume to be circular: we normalize L = 1 without loss of generality. Firms that enter this market are assumed to offer products that are identical in all characteristics other than their locations in the attribute space. We do not model firms' choice of technologies but rather assume that all firms employ either a designated technology or a flexible technology. When firms employ the designated technology they each produce a single good with a defined characteristic that cannot be customized, so that the "location" of firm i is the characteristic x i [0, 1] that this firm offers. By contrast, with the flexible technology the producer starts with a 'basic product' and customizes or personalizes it to the precise specifications of particular consumers.
"This means that the firm now produces a band of horizontally differentiated products centered upon its basic product instead of a single product." (Norman and Thisse (1996) 
In other words, with flexible manufacturing the "location" of firm i is the attribute of the basic product x i [0, 1] on which the range of customized products offered by firm i is centered.
Production costs for firms that enter the market are assumed to be identical and to exhibit economies of scale. The production cost function for firm i is
where c are (constant) marginal costs and f are fixed costs.
3 If the firms are assumed to operate the flexible technology, they also incur customization costs. The cost of customizing basic product x i to attribute x is assumed to be
Firms face an ad valorem tax rate v and a unit or specific tax rate s . Consumers are distributed over this space at density D which, without loss of generality, we can normalize to D = 1. Consumer j's "address" is defined as x j [0, 1] , where x j denotes this consumer's most preferred product attribute. Each consumer is assumed to buy exactly one unit of the product that offers her the greatest utility. The indirect utility that consumer j gets from buying a product with attribute x at price p(x) is
where V is the consumer's reservation price. The parameter t can be given one of two familiar interpretations. If we consider this to be a pure spatial model, t is unit transport cost, while if we think of this as a model of horizontal product differentiation, t is the valuation consumers place on the utility they lose from having to consume other than their ideal product. We assume that V is sufficiently large that the market is covered in each of the equilibria we consider below.
The flexible manufacturing technology has two essential characteristics. First 0 < r < t and second, each consumer obtains the same utility from basic product x i customized to attribute x as from a basic product x if the products are offered at the same price. 4 Firms in this market compete in a two-stage game. In the first stage they (simultaneously) decide whether to enter and the locations, or attributes of their (basic) products. In the second stage they compete in prices à la Bertrand. We confine our attention to two, exogenously determined, pricing policies. With non-discriminatory pricing each firm sets a (mill) price p i . The full price that a consumer with most preferred product attribute x pays to consume firm i's product is then
. With discriminatory pricing the only restriction imposed on firm i's price to any consumer location is that the firm never prices below marginal cost, including commodity taxes.
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we confine our attention throughout to symmetric locations of the entrant firms. 5 We still need to identify, however, what is meant by equilibrium in the entry subgame. Entry takes place to the point where no additional entrant expects to break even, but this leaves a potentially wide range of potential equilibria determined by the costs that incumbent firms incur in re-locating or, in the product differentiation interpretation, re-anchoring their (basic) products. We concentrate throughout on two polar cases
spatial contestability (SC) in which re-anchoring costs are zero; and (ii) spatial non-contestability (SNC) in which re-anchoring costs are prohibitive.
With SC the only candidate equilibrium is the maximum packing configuration in which all incumbent firms just break even. With SNC the candidate equilibria range from this maximum packing equilibrium to the minimum packing equilibrium in which a sophisticated entrant just fails to break even given the (symmetric) locations of the incumbents. In this context a sophisticated entrant is an entrant that can "foresee the price equilibrium that would prevail if they were to enter" (Eaton and Wooders (1985) , p. 283). We confine our attention in the SNC case to the minimum packing equilibrium.
In the analyses that follow, we take as our benchmark the equilibrium number of products that maximizes social welfare. We use N to indicate the number of firms (or basic products) and N * to indicate the socially optimal number of firms (or products) in equilibrium. Given our specification (3) of the consumer utility function, the socially optimal degree of product variety is the number of (basic) products that minimizes total costs
where h = t with the designated technology and r with the flexible technology. As we would expect, N* is increasing in transport, utility or customization costs and decreasing in set-up costs.
Tax Policy in the Absence of Price Discrimination
In this section, we consider whether tax policy can be used to achieve the market structure that maximizes social welfare when firms are unable to price discriminate. We focus primarily on markets with designated technologies. While we briefly consider tax policy in the presence of flexible technologies, we argue that firms are likely to price discriminate when they employ such technologies because, in the absence of regulations to the contrary, flexible manufacturing undermines the ability of firms to make credible commitments not to price discriminate. Since the firms have the ability to offer a wide range of product variants they can, subject only to arbitrage constraints, price these variants individually. Competition between firms for individual consumers can then be expected to undermine any attempt to maintain a pricing policy with the inflexible characteristics of non-discriminatory (mill) pricing. Simply put, competition is likely to become Bertrand-at-every-point.
Designated Technologies
When firms employ designated technologies and re-anchoring is costless, the determination of the price equilibrium is as described in Kay and Keen (1983) . After reviewing this equilibrium, we consider the case where re-anchoring is ruled out by high costs. Assume that there are N active firms uniformly distributed over the market. Consider firm i and assume that all other firms have set the mill price p. Then the consumer located at x who is indifferent between buying from firm i and the nearest neighbor to firm i is characterized by
Demand to firm i is 2x or
and profit to firm i is
Taking the derivative with respect to p i , setting this to zero and solving for p i with the symmetry assumption that in equilibrium p = p i gives the equilibrium price
The equilibrium number of firms is then determined by the degree of spatial contestability in the market.
Spatial Contestability (SC)
When the market is SC the equilibrium condition is, as in Kay and Keen (1983) , that the entrant firms just break even. Substituting (9) into (8) with p = p i and simplifying gives the equilibrium condition on the degree of product variety 
The producer price, p , is unaffected by s , so these unit taxes are fully passed forward in the sense of the consumer price rising by the amount of the tax.
7 Ad valorem tax incidence can be decomposed into two components: a direct effect and an indirect effect through the change in the equilibrium number of firms. Fixing N,
The complete incidence is given by differentiating equation (11):
The change in price is half the change in the case where N is fixed. In other words, firm exit contributes to half the incidence being shifted forward to consumers. Firms exit because an increase in ad valorem taxation is equivalent (from the firm's point of view) to an increase in fixed costs relative to revenue (see Kay and Keen for details).
Since the specific tax is passed on fully as an increase in prices, it follows, as can be seen from (10), that the equilibrium degree of product variety is a function solely of the ad valorem tax rate. Recall that equation (5) gives the socially optimal number of firms, N * . We can now choose the ad valorem tax rate to achieve the socially optimal number of firms (set
Comparing (5) and (10), an ad valorem tax rate of 75% is required to achieve this result. Note that this value for the optimal tax rate holds regardless of any parameters of the model. In other words, the optimal tax rate is entirely model driven as a result of which one should not put too much stock on the particular numerical value. Rather, it highlights the result (due to Kay and Keen) that a positive tax can be beneficial to discourage excess entry. We will show below, however, that this result is not robust to changes in assumptions about technology, pricing policies, and entry conditions.
Spatial Non-Contestability (SNC)
When the market is SNC the relevant equilibrium condition is that an entrant just fails to break even given that the incumbents do not relocate in response to entry (because re-anchoring costs are prohibitively high) but are expected by the entrant to change their prices optimally in response to entry. We must first, therefore, identify the Nash equilibrium prices that the entrant expects to prevail post-entry.
It is a familiar result that an entrant should locate midway between some pair of incumbents. So suppose that the entrant, denoted 0, locates midway between two incumbents, denoted -1 and 1. The incumbents will change their prices in response to entry and this price change will affect their nearest neighbors, 2 and -2 who can be expected to change their prices, affecting their neighbors 3 and -3 and so on. A chain reaction is set up in the post-entry mill prices of the incumbent firms.
Suppose that there are N firms pre-entry. Then we have the following: The direct and complete incidences of commodity taxes are as for the SC case.
Comparison with (10) indicates, as we would expect, that SNC leads to lower equilibrium product variety than in a market with spatial contestability. The SNC market environment does not, however, provide qualitatively different results from the Kay and Keen analysis. Where the optimal tax is 75 percent in the latter case, the optimal tax now is 37.8 percent. Ad valorem taxes are overshifted in both cases with the overshifting arising from firm exit in response to the ad valorem tax.
Recall that the equilibrium price is given by equation (9) in either the contestable or non-contestable market. Non-contestability affects the equilibrium number of firms and allows for the possibility of economic rents. From equations (8) In addition to serving as an instrument for achieving optimal product diversity, the ad valorem tax serves to appropriate some of the economic rents earned in non-contestable markets. With an optimal tax rate of 37.8 percent, aggregate economic rents are reduced by 21.1 percent.
Flexible Technology
We argued at the beginning of this section that firms are unlikely to be able to commit not to price discriminate when technology is flexible. For completeness, however, we report results for the case where firms can commit to non-discriminatory prices.
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The difference between this case with flexible technology and those analyzed above is that "transport" costs are now customization costs and so are part of the tax base. Whether the market is SC or SNC there is excessive product variety in the absence of commodity taxes which can be corrected by a positive ad valorem tax: of 100% with spatial contestability, and 58.2% with spatial non-contestability. Table 1 below summarizes our results when firms can commit not to price discriminate. In all cases the equilibrium number of firms exceeds the socially optimal number of firms. Ad valorem taxes, therefore, can be used to reduce excess product variety and achieve the social optimum. The optimizing tax rate varies from 37.8 to 100 percent depending on technology and re-anchoring costs. It appears that Kay and Keen's result is robust to entry conditions and technology. However, we next turn to the case where firms price discriminate, and we find that this result is sensitive to the pricing rule.
Tax Policy With Price Discrimination
As we pointed out in the Introduction, price discrimination is a widely practiced reality and is likely to become more so as a result of the introduction of flexible manufacturing in traditional sectors and versioning in e-commerce markets. This implies that we should consider how the ability of tax policy to affect market structure is altered in the presence of price discrimination.
Designated Technology
We begin by assuming that the entrant firms adopt the designated technology but choose discriminatory prices. This changes the price equilibrium. The price charged by firm i to each consumer is such that the utility for each consumer that purchases from firm i is exactly what they would achieve if they bought at cost from the next most preferred competitor. Consider a consumer whose most preferred product attribute is between firm i and i+1 "distance" x such that this consumer is located nearer to firm i than to firm i+1. The break-even price for firm i+1 (p(x)) occurs when the post-tax price equals costs:
Firm i sets a price, p i (x) so that the utility to this consumer located distance x from firm i is no less than the utility the consumer receives if he purchases from firm i+1 when that firm charges its break-even price. This Nash equilibrium price for firm i is given by: (2) indicates whether the market is spatially contestable (SC) or spatially non-contestable (SNC). A plus sign (+) in Column (3) means that there is too much entry in equilibrium relative to the socially optimal amount. The last column reports the ad valorem tax rate required to achieve the socially optimal market structure.
A similar (symmetric) equation holds for consumers to the left of the firm. It follows that the price schedule that firm i applies is 
Spatial Contestability
Entry occurs until profits go to zero. Thus, in equilibrium,
and the equilibrium consumer price is (22) ( )
As in the no-price discrimination case, equation (19) indicates that with a given number of firms any taxes are fully shifted to the consumer. Once the impact of taxes on market structure is taken into account, equation (22) indicates that the excise tax is fully shifted forward while the ad valorem tax is overshifted. Increasing v has the effect of raising fixed costs and so driving out firms. Comparison with (10) indicates, however, that as in Kay and Keen, there is an excessive number of firms in the absence of commodity taxes, a feature that is typical of spatially contestable markets. The optimal ad valorem tax rate can get us to the optimum, the optimal tax rate being 50% in this case.
Spatial Non-Contestability
With spatial non-contestability and price discrimination, the price equilibrium for a sophisticated entrant is straightforward: equation (19) applies to the entrant as well as to the incumbents. In order to identify the zero-profit condition for an entrant, denote the market area obtained by an incumbent firm, given that there are N firms in the market, as M = 1/N. Putting this into equation (20) we have that the profit of a firm with market area M is
Now consider an entrant. This firm will enter mid-way between two incumbents, charge prices characterized by the equilibrium condition (19) and so will capture a market of area M/2. As a result, the entrant's profit is
This means that the equilibrium number of firms is
Ad valorem taxes continue to reduce product variety. However, the intense price competition that an entrant expects to face together with the product specification commitment that incumbents are able to make because of the prohibitive re-anchoring costs means that, even in the absence of commodity taxes, there is too little product variety. Since an increase in the ad valorem tax rate decreases equilibrium product variety, we now find that the optimal tax rate needed to generate the socially optimal product variety is actually a subsidy of 100% of the consumer price. In other words, the government should match one-for-one consumer payments to the firm. Firms continue to earn economic rents, 10 with the rents per firm now being In contrast to the environment in which price discrimination is prohibited, the use of a tax to achieve the optimal amount of product diversity will increase economic rents, in this model by 41.5 percent since the optimal tax is negative.
10 If firms employ designated technologies, spatial non-contestability in the presence of sophisticated pricing also differs from spatial contestability in allowing for the presence of rents in equilibrium. Ad valorem taxation will appropriate some of those rents to the extent that it reduces the number of firms in equilibrium. If price discrimination occurs, however, the optimal tax increases the number of firms and so increases aggregate rents in this market. This indicates the potential gains that arise from the ability to tax rents directly in non-contestable markets when price discrimination is allowed.
Flexible Technology
Now consider situations in which firms adopt flexible technologies. Recall that this means that the firms can customize their products to the precise requirements of their customers. In a purely spatial context it is equivalent to the firm controlling and potentially charging for delivery of the product to its consumers.
A similar logic as was used to derive equation (18) (18) in that the cost of customization (r) is now included in the tax base whereas in equation (18) . This is precisely the same as the profit that firm i earns when all tax rates are zero. It follows that when firms operate flexible technologies and are allowed to price discriminate, neither ad valorem nor specific taxes have any impact on product variety. All taxes are passed on in full to consumers. In other words, since the producer price at each consumer location is ( ) ( )
and N is independent of v , there is no direct or indirect effect of ad valorem taxes on producer prices.
What about the equilibrium number of basic products that will be established? By the same argument as in section 3 we know that with spatial contestability the equilibrium location configuration is such that all incumbents just break even. By contrast, with spatial non-contestability it must be that an entrant, who gains a market share 1/2N and profits of one-quarter those of the incumbents, just fails to break even. It follows from (28) that the equilibrium number of product variants in these two cases is
With spatial contestability there are too many basic products relative to the social optimum (see equation (5)) and with spatial non-contestability there are too few.
Much more fundamentally, an important implication of equations (29) and (30) is that government has lost the ability to use commodity taxes to move the industry to the optimal number of firms. Some other instrument will be needed but, as can be seen from (30), the options available to policy makers are limited. Equilibrium product variety is a function solely of customization costs, fixed costs and, implicitly, re-anchoring costs. Table 2 summarizes our analytical results with respect to the equilibrium degree of product variety and the ad valorem tax rate needed to generate the socially optimal product variety for markets where firms may price discriminate. Only if the technology is designated and re-anchoring is costless is it optimal to levy an ad valorem tax to achieve desired product variety. If re-anchoring is prohibitively costly, then a subsidy is required. More striking is the result with flexible technology. Now tax policy is completely ineffective for achieving optimal product variety. Given the likely growth in importance of flexible technologies, this is a troubling result. (2) indicates whether the market is spatially contestable (SC) or spatially non-contestable (SNC). A plus sign (+) in Column (3) means that there is too much entry in equilibrium relative to the socially optimal amount. The last column reports the ad valorem tax rate required to achieve the socially optimal market structure.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
Suppose that firms are able credibly to commit not to price discriminate, either through their choice of technology or as a result of regulations prohibiting price discrimination that are rigidly enforced. Then it is apparent that there is always excessive product variety in the absence of commodity taxes, no matter the ease with which firms can reanchor their product specifications (the degree of spatial contestability) and whether or not firms adopt flexible technologies. The direct result of this type of commitment is that firms are protected against selective price cuts and so are able to maintain higher prices than would be the case with price discrimination. This in turn leads to more firm entry than is socially desirable. In these circumstances, specific taxes can be used to generate tax revenues while ad valorem taxes can be used to achieve the optimal market structure. This is the basic lesson from Kay and Keen (1983) and has been the received wisdom of economists for the past twenty years. We show that in the absence of price discrimination changes in technology and the presence of non-zero re-anchoring costs affect the magnitudes of the tax rates needed to generate the desired market structure but not the basic message. Now suppose that this commitment is undermined, perhaps by changes in technology or a more relaxed policy stance. This changes matters significantly. No matter whether firms adopt designated or flexible manufacturing techniques, it is apparent that with price discrimination the ease with which firms can re-anchor the characteristics of their products "matters" for market structure and the design of commodity taxation policy.
With designated technologies it is still possible to assign instruments -unit taxes to revenue generation and ad valorem taxes to structural objectives -but it is no longer the case that the market will always support excessive product variety in the absence of taxes. While we have dealt analytically with the two extremes -of zero and prohibitive re-anchoring costs -we can use Norman and Thisse (1999) to conclude more generally that the minimum sustainable degree of product variety is an inverse function of reanchoring costs. In other words, when re-anchoring is relatively inexpensive a positive ad valorem tax is necessary to achieve the optimal market structure. By contrast, when it is relatively expensive for firms to re-anchor their products they are able to make binding commitments to product specifications that deter entry sufficiently for a subsidy to be needed to attain the socially optimal market structure.
Thus market structure undercuts the traditional view that comes out of the Kay and Keen analysis that ad valorem taxation is beneficial to reduce excess product variety. High initial entry costs, a high degree of product complexity and quality and high advertising expenditures -particularly those intended to build brand and corporate image -all point to a lack of spatial contestability and a possible reversal of the Kay and Keen result.
Matters are even worse with flexible manufacturing systems. It remains the case that the ease with which firms can re-anchor their basic products is important in determining whether or not product variety is excessive. However, now we find that commodity taxes can no longer be used to affect market structure. These taxes are passed on in full to consumers leaving no direct or indirect incidence on firms. If part of the motivation for deregulation was the belief that the tax system could be used to achieve optimal market structure, then policy analysts need to examine carefully the ease with which firms can customize or personalize their product offerings. Moreover, our analysis adds a further dimension to the current debate on taxation of Internet transactions. We noted in the introduction that modern developments in e-commerce allow firms to "version" their services in much the same manner that flexible manufacturing systems do. Our analysis then implies that one should not be overly sanguine about the possibility of using commodity taxes to attain structural objectives in Internet-based markets.
An alternative possibility can be suggested. The equilibrium that we have identified with price discrimination and spatial non-contestability is the minimum packing degree of product variety. We also indicated, however, that the market can support as an equilibrium any degree of product variety between this minimum packing and the maximum packing that zero re-anchoring cost generates. What this implies is that if policy can be formulated to encourage entry in emerging markets it may be possible to gain an outcome that is nearer to the social optimum even when commodity taxes are largely ineffective.
One final point should be made in concluding. Clearly, the Salop model on which our analysis is based is highly restrictive. It is a partial equilibrium model with a very particular approach to product differentiation and consumer choice. We would argue, however, that its restrictive nature in no way detracts from our central point. One should be very cautious of arriving at conclusions about optimal tax rules without detailed knowledge of how the underlying market structure is determined and, therefore, how or even whether it will react to commodity and other taxes.
